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The Hazards of the Right to an
Education
A study of the schooling of migrant worker children in Chengdu
Chloé Froissart
NOTE DE L’ÉDITEUR
Translated from the French original by Peter Brown
1 Education for all  is  both a basic civil  right and a determining factor in a country’s
development.  It  is  not,  however,  universally guaranteed in the People’s  Republic  of
China.  This  is  especially  true  for  the  hundreds  of  thousands  of  children  from  the
countryside whose parents have come to the city in search of employment. Excluded
from the urban education system until 1996, only a fraction of these children now have
access  to  it  in  circumstances  that  are  turning  them,  as  a  group,  into  victims  of
discrimination. Yet, the 1982 Chinese Constitution stipulates that “the citizens of the
People’s Republic of China have the right as well as the duty to receive an education”
(art. 46). In 1986, China introduced a system of compulsory education lasting nine years
for every child from the age of six or seven and ratified the United Nations Charter on
the Rights of the Child as well as the International Convention on Economic, Social and
Cultural  Rights,  both of  which mention the  right  to  an education.  So,  how can we
understand that this right is not guaranteed, while it is constantly being reaffirmed by
the Chinese state? A number of community initiatives have come about to alleviate the
difficulties that migrant children have in gaining access to public education. Thus some
non-government  schools  specialising  in  accommodating  these  children  have  been
created. Yet, does the education that these schools offer their pupils enable them to
counter  the  discrimination  of  which  they  are  victim?  How  can  we  explain  the
difficulties that these schools are encountering in trying to obtain a guarantee from the
state and what strategies are they implementing to gain public recognition?
A worrying situation
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2 The problem is an urgent one, and we can guess that it is going to become more acute
by dint of the increase both in family migrations and in the length of their stay in the
cities 1. As early as 1996, the State Commission for Education estimated the number of
school-age migrant children to be between two and three million 2. This can only be an
approximation,  doubtless  on  the  low  side,  as  the  long,  complicated  and  costly
formalities that migrants have to go through in order to be allowed to reside and work
in the cities mean that many of them remain illegal and so do not show up in the
census. Their numbers have been put at 100 million by the Chinese government and at
120 million by Human Rights in China 3. Out of a sample of 102 migrant workers who we
interviewed in Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan province, 36% have come with their
children and nearly three-quarters wish to settle in the city. This means that many
children, who would be regarded as being from the countryside given that this status is
passed on from one generation to the next, are in actual fact yet to join their parents in
the city or be born there 4.
3 The reason why these children come to the city in the first place is because they have
no chance to continue their studies in the country. The education system in rural areas,
which receives much less state support than in the cities (5), is not in a position to offer
them an education that would enable them to have a better future than their parents
had. How can we explain the fact that these children do not have access to the same
conditions for study as city residents do?
Institutional barriers
4 Chinese society rests on a fundamental institution, the system of residence (hukou),
which  appears  neither  in  the  Constitution  nor  in  the  laws  of  the  country  but  was
gradually introduced by administrative regulations during the course of the 1950s 6 in
order to respond to the need for social control and to the choices made by the regime
for  economic  development.  During  the  Maoist  period,  it  was  the  cornerstone  of  a
broader  economic  and  administrative  package  identifying  people  in  terms  of  their
place of registration and conferring on them rights that varied in relation to their place
in the system of production. While the state took direct responsibility for “the iron
bowl of rice” 7 of city dwellers, rural communities had to rely on their own strengths, at
the same time as producing the surpluses necessary to finance industrialisation. The
reforms  had  the  effect  of  making  the  system  of  residency  more  flexible,  and  the
movement  of  people  became  tolerated  to  accommodate  the  needs  of  the  market
economy,  but  it  still  remains  in  force  and  is  blocking  the  emergence  of  any  real
citizenry.  Belonging to  society  is  still  a  function of  one’s  place  of  registration.  The
education of children, like all other social rights, is guaranteed by local governments
only  for  their  own constituents.  That  is  why the right  to  an education,  recognised
under Chinese law, has no legal value for the children who reside in a place that is
different to the one in which they are registered. The system of the hukou, increasing as
it  does  the risk  and cost  of  migration,  is  deliberately  kept  in  place by the Chinese
authorities who fear being confronted by a massive and uncontrollable rural exodus.
Migrations have to enable the urban economy’s needs in terms of labour to be met as
they arise without jeopardising the demographic balance between the cities and the
countryside.
5 This  system for  managing and controlling  the  population was  strengthened by  the
decentralisation laws that began to be put in place from the early 1980s. The Law on
Compulsory Education in the People’s Republic of China (8), passed at the Fourth Conference
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of  the  Sixth  National  People’s  Congress  on  April  12th 1986,  introduced a  system of
compulsory schooling comprising the six years of  primary education and the three
years  of  junior  secondary,  but  transferred  the  responsibility  and  management  of
education to local governments. “The educational sphere, under the authority of the
State Council, is the responsibility of local governments, with its management being
decentralised” (art. 8). The Law on Education in the People’s Republic of China (9), voted for
in 1995, strengthened the principle of “local responsibility and a graded management
structure”  (difang  fuze,  fenji  guanli).  Primary  and  secondary  education  are  first  and
foremost a matter for the cantons in the rural areas and for the districts in the cities,
with higher education coming under the auspices of the provinces (arts. 14 and 15). In
other  words,  at  the  very  time  when  the  Chinese  state  was  undertaking  economic
reforms aimed at the market economy posited on the free circulation of people, the
nature of the administrative reforms that it introduced ran counter to the guarantee of
individual rights by making them subject to the condition of territorial management.
6 It is in these circumstances that we must understand the publication of the Temporary
Measures for the Schooling of Children and Adolescents from the Migrating Population by the
State Commission for Education and the Ministry for Public Security in 1998 (the 1998
Measures) 10. While these measures allowed migrant children to enrol in public schools
in the cities as well as the setting up of specialist non-government schools to receive
them, they were an attempt on the one hand to regain control of the situation on the
ground, in particular the appearance of illegal schools, and on the other to endorse
discriminatory practices against this population more even than to put up institutional
barriers to the equality of rights as such.
7 First  of  all,  as  their  name  suggests,  they  were  temporary  measures  that  proposed
temporary solutions by tinkering with an institutional system without undermining it.
They were in no way concerned to encourage pupils to have their schooling somewhere
other than where their hukou is registered. The measures explicitly brought about a
transfer of responsibility from rural to urban governments regarding the compulsory
education of children with more than six months’ residence in a city and who do not
have  either  parents  or  a  guardian  in  a  rural  area.  However,  they  have  not  been
accompanied  by  any  transfer  of  funds  required  for  their  implementation.  Local
governments continue to allocate resources to education in relation to the number of
their permanent residents 11.  Children who have been resident in a city for several
years are therefore still  in fact deprived of  the public assistance to which they are
rightfully  entitled  by  law.  Moreover,  these  measures  are  minimalist  (no  specific
mention  is  made  about  urban  governments  being  required  to  “create  favourable
conditions  for  compulsory  schooling  for  children  from  a  migrant  population
background”), carrying little obligation (no control system having been provided), and
leave  a  good  deal  of  room  for  manoeuvre  to  “the  People’s  governments  in  the
provinces, the autonomous regions and the municipalities under direct administration
[that] determine measures to be applied in relation to their situation” (art. 18). These
measures  illustrate  what  has  become,  in  popular  parlance,  the  unofficial  slogan  of
decentralisation:  “the  centre  proposes,  local  government  disposes”  (zhongyang  you
zhengce, difang you duice).
The state school: a “melting pot” of inequalities and a factor of marginalisation
8 The 1998 Measures state that children of migrants must be first and foremost educated
“temporarily”  (jiedu)  in  state  schools.  But  this  permission  to enrol  is  subject  to
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conditions and does not come with any guarantee. It concerns only “legal” children
with a temporary city residence permit and who were not born outside the plan. The
rural and urban governments are requested to co-operate in order to strictly control
this  group  of  people.  Migrant  children  are  required  to  be  registered  with  the
government of their village and the body in charge of education in their canton (from
which they have to get an authorisation in order to be able to attend school in the city),
as well as with their school and the police station in their place of origin. With these
papers, they must then file a request with the school closest to their city residence,
which is within its rights to refuse admission to the child. In the case of rejection, a
second request must be made to the Education office of the place of immigration that
will take on the responsibility of “finding a solution through arbitration” (arts. 5 and 8).
When we realise  the  difficulties  that  the  rural  population has  in  gaining  access  to
government  agencies,  the  further  problems  that  it  encounters  in  order  to  obtain
authorisations  and  the  charging  of  arbitrary  taxes  of  which  it  is  victim,  these
preliminary  steps  already  appear  as  an  almost  insurmountable  hurdle  to  migrant
children being able to go to school. They are therefore little adhered to in practice.
9 The second condition for enrolling migrant children in state schools is an economic
one, school fees being fully the responsibility of families. In order to avoid the problem
of  allocating public  resources  mentioned above,  the  1998 Measures  provide for  the
possibility  for  urban  schools  to  raise  “temporary  enrolment  taxes”  (jiedufei)  in
accordance with national legislation 12. The latter makes the Municipal Offices of Prices,
Finances and Education jointly responsible for setting a benchmark for this tax and
submitting it for approval to the provincial government. In Chengdu, the norm is about
400 yuan a semester for primary school and 1,000 yuan a semester for junior secondary
13. These figures are an average as the amount of this tax varies in reality in relation to
the prestige of the schools and the quality of the teaching. Moreover, some schools
consider that they must be compensated for accepting students who, in their view,
undermine  their  standards  and  reputation,  and  to  whom  their  legal  responsibility
remains unclear. In actual practice, this levy is therefore at the discretion of the school
principal.  According to the parents  of  children at  Bashu School,  a  non-government
school in Chengdu specialising in receiving migrant children, it amounts to about 9,000
yuan for the six years of primary school, that is about 1,500 yuan a year. Many schools
require full payment of this tax for the six years of primary school or for several years
in advance, while the legislation itself stipulates payment by semester. The amounts
due are not generally reimbursed in cases where children leave the school, whether
they  are  expelled  or  their  parents  decide  to  withdraw them from the  school.  In  a
context  of  the  de  facto  and  non-regulated  privatisation  of  the  Chinese  education
system, the payment of this tax is in addition to the school fees (about 350 yuan for a
semester of primary school) as well as to the countless levies arbitrarily put in place by
state schools over the past few years for the needs of their day-to-day operation. Thus
it is that English, computer science and sport have become fee-paying optional courses
which cost, again according to the parents at Bashu School, more than 2,000 yuan a
year. These same parents also complain about the dramatic increases in all  sorts of
unwarranted taxes (luan shou fei): for night classes, sitting examinations, having people
supervise in the playground and the canteen, etc. 14. If the problem is the same for city
residents, and this in spite of Chinese law guaranteeing free, compulsory education,
these parents, who have emigrated above all for economic reasons, cannot cope with so
many expenses and are often forced to take their children out of school.
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10 This de facto privatisation is overlaid by a non-transparent system of control that is
exercised by district governments with a stake in it, either directly or indirectly, in so
far as it allows them to lighten their expenditure. The implementation of an effective
control mechanism turns out to be at the very least illusory, if  one thinks that the
Chinese state devotes only 2.5% of its GNP to education—that is less than the great
majority of the poorest developing countries, which on average allocate 4% of their
GNP to it (15)—and where, in the absence of any separation of powers, there exist no
judicial controls. The only other course of action open to parents is to complain to the
administrative bodies in charge of education, under whose jurisdiction the schools are
placed 16.  While the “construction taxes” and “support taxes” given to schools,  that
could add up to several tens of thousands of yuan a year, have been largely abolished in
practice following their banning by the central authorities (17), others have appeared in
their  place.  Quite  often  in  China,  political  campaigns  attempt  to  make  up  for  the
failures and contradictions of the system. One such campaign, which began in Chengdu
in February 2003, announced the total elimination of the arbitrary raising of taxes by
schools by the end of March 18. In mid-April (19), the media were still calling on parents
to denounce the practice, although the authorities denounced the problem themselves.
However,  we  are  still  far  from  a  political  campaign in  favour  of  the  right  to  an
education for children from the countryside, particularly given that discrimination is
also part of a conscious strategy by the urban authorities to limit the influx of migrants
and maximise the profits generated by their labour, at the same time as minimising the
cost of social benefits.
11 Added to this institutional discrimination against migrant children is another, popular
one, in which the legislation is sometimes complicit. The urban schools—those that are
not explicitly obliged by law to do so—are reluctant to accommodate these pupils from
the countryside by dint of their supposed “lowly quality” (sushi taidi). This expression
not only refers to the often mediocre academic level of these children, attributable to
the detrimental state in which the education system in the countryside finds itself, but
also carries an essentialist connotation, that is that these children are assumed to have
an  inherent  “flaw”  due  to  a  considerable  backwardness  in  their  process  of
“civilisation”.  They are isolated within the school,  with the other students  keeping
them away from their games or putting them down because they are badly dressed.
Moreover, the teachers sometimes put pressure on the school principals to expel the
migrants, as they receive bonuses if the students do well in their exams, and so are
hostile to these children whose results are generally inferior. Similarly, urban families
take a dim view of the increase in the number of migrants in their children’s school 20.
For these reasons, no doubt more than to avoid the inadequacy of the ability of urban
schools to accommodate these migrant children (21), the 1998 Measures foreshadowed
the possibility of creating extra classes in which the migrant children could receive
instruction from retired teachers (art. 10), thereby legitimising a “two gear” education
system.
12 Some migrant children see the doors to state schools quite simply being shut to them,
even  if  their  parents  can afford  the  school  fees.  This  is  the  case,  for  example,  of
handicapped children: limping may be a reason for refusing a child entry to a school, as
he or she “is not the same as the others”. Migrant children who are admitted despite
their “handicap” do not get any assistance or attention from the teachers. One father
tells how his son, who suffers from a mild shaking in his hands and does not write as
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fast as the others, has not been able to carry on with his studies in a state school, as the
teachers wipe out what is on the blackboard without waiting for him to finish taking it
down and the other students do not want to lend him their exercise books 22. 
13 The parents whom we have met emphasise that, even when they have the necessary
money for a state school, their children are in an environment that is too hostile to
allow proper study.  They add that,  contrary to their  mission,  state schools prevent
social integration: “Right from an early age, the children feel rejected and harbour a
feeling of bitterness towards society” 23.
Is there an alternative to state schools?
14 To respond to the needs of these children who are excluded from the education system,
schools  started  to  spring  up  in  the  major  urban centres  in  the  mid-1990s  through
private, informal and spontaneous initiatives. Often set up by the migrants themselves,
they  attest  to  a  form of  self-reliance  to  deal  with  a  problem to  which no-one was
providing any solution. One of the earliest of these, the Xingzhi School, was opened in
1994  in  a  row  of  huts  in  a  disused  lot  in  Peking  by  a  female  teacher  from  the
countryside in Hebei province, after her friends and neighbours, migrant workers like
her, had asked her to give a few classes to their children 24.
15 The fees for these self-managed and self-funded schools are in Peking no more than 300
yuan a semester 25 on average, and they “make do” as best they can. Located on the city
outskirts where the migrants live, their premises are old flats, single-storey unhealthy
houses, or abandoned warehouses that have been refitted. They generally employ a
teaching staff without either the experience or the level required; some of whom come
from the country, just like some of the school books used. The sanitary, security and
teaching conditions are often deplorable, with the children being piled up in small,
badly ventilated and badly lit classrooms that are stifling in summer. In these classes
that routinely have more than fifty people in them, students of different ages and levels
follow  the  same  courses.  Few  of  these  schools  offer  any  secondary  education.  The
furniture—tables, chairs, board, etc.—is made in a roughshod way by the school staff or
bought cheaply from state schools that sell off their used equipment. Few schools have
any playground or sporting equipment 26.
16 At  the  end of  1996,  the  Peking districts  of  Haidian and Fengtai  had at  least  seven
primary  schools  set  up  by  and  for  migrants,  that  were  attended  by  more  than  a
thousand children 27. By the end of 2000, in Peking alone, there were over two hundred
schools  of  this  kind  with  more  than  forty  thousand  pupils  28.  On  account  of  their
growing  number  and  the  competition  between  them,  some  of  the  more  important
schools tried to bring the quality of their teaching and material into line with that of
the  urban  schools.  Thus,  while  the  schools  with  several  thousand  pupils  gradually
introduced  classes  in  English  and  computer  studies,  those  with  only  a  few  dozen
students are still struggling to provide basic education in Chinese and mathematics 29.
17 These schools have no legal status, which means that they cannot award certificates or
give status for courses completed, which is a considerable problem when the students
wish to re-enter a state school or have the level of their studies recognised for the
purpose of finding a job. Moreover, these schools are routinely banned and demolished
without the authorities worrying about placing the children in other schools. However,
the 1998 Temporary Measures for the Schooling of Children and Adolescents of the Migrant
Population announced the possibility  for  the “social  forces” to  create  “substandard”
(jianyi xuexiao) schools for migrant children to which local governments and bodies in
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charge of education are required to give their “active support” (art. 9).  But the law
stopped there, so that out of the 19 provisions contained in these Measures, only one
concerned those schools that specialise in accommodating migrant children. Thus, the
civil servants responsible for authorising and controlling these schools, who have “no
directive to follow or any idea of government requirements regarding these informal
schools”,  as  the  director  of  one  of  them in  Peking  laments  (30),  perfectly  naturally
referred  to  the  Regulations  for  the  Establishment  of  Schools  by  the  Social  Forces (1997
Regulations) (31), drawn up by the State Council in 1997. These regulations have the aim
of “encouraging businesses, institutions, associations and other social organisations as
well as citizens” to develop the sectors of professional training and adult education, as
well as any preceding, following or complementing the period of compulsory schooling
(day care, advanced teaching of languages, short courses to prepare for exams, etc.).
With regard to the compulsory education system, private initiatives are encouraged in
order to “complement” the state sector system when the latter cannot meet the social
demand.  This  has  given  rise  to  the  creation  of  what  are  commonly  called  the
“aristocratic schools” (guizu xuexiao) offering a well-heeled elite better conditions of
education.  The  requirements  in  terms  of  the  internal  organisation  and  day-to-day
operation of these schools, the initial investment and the income, quality of equipment,
staff and teaching corps, etc., are in total contradiction to the particular dispensation
granted by the 1998 Measures to those schools hosting migrants and are manifestly not
adapted to the specific problem of the schooling of these children. The lack of means
available to migrants (finance, knowledge and social network), their ignorance of the
law as  well  as  the  often  distant  and  mistrustful  relations  that  they  have  with  the
authorities explain the impossibility in which they find themselves to set up schools in
accordance with the criteria laid down by the 1997 Regulations/ or should this be the
1998 Measures?. The latter are to be replaced, from September 1st 2003, by the Law for
Promoting  Non-State  School  Education  in  the  PRC ( 32),  passed in  December  2002 by  the
Permanent Committee of the National People’s Congress. This law will, in any event, do
no more than highlight the problem, to the extent that it  increases the number of
conditions for creating such schools and strengthens control over them. However, the
research  we  have  carried  out  in  Chengdu  at  a  new  generation  of  educational
establishments  reveals  that  the  difficulties  facing  the  schools  for  the  children  of
migrants in obtaining state recognition go well  beyond the mere lack of legislation
dealing with them.
The race for recognition
18 We noticed in the Sichuan capital the appearance of a new generation of principals who
set  up schools  for  migrant  children about  a  year  ago.  These  are  city  residents  not
originally  from Chengdu who,  both through personal  conviction and drawn by  the
profits  to  be  made,  wanted  to  respond  to  the  needs  of  a  migrant  population  that
continues to swell. Over the course of the nearly ten years that this phenomenon of
migrant schools has been evolving, some have seen this sector as a potential source of
profit.  Thus,  before  opening his  school  in  Chengdu,  the founder of  Yangfan School
conducted  a  vast  survey  in  several  Chinese  cities  that  looked  very  much  like  a
marketing  study.  These  new  directors  have,  moreover,  been  encouraged  by  a
favourable political climate, particularly through the campaign against poverty and by
giving  help  to  “weaker  social  groups”  (ruoshi  qunti),  which  was  announced  at  the
session of the National People’s Congress in March 2002. The people setting up these
schools, not being migrant workers themselves, possess the intellectual and financial
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means needed to carry out their  plans.  The two schools that we have followed the
closest (33), Bashu and Yangfan, are based on an initial investment of 200,000 yuan and
500,000 yuan respectively.  The founder of the first  named, Mrs Xiao Hongtao,  from
Chongqing, is a former junior secondary school teacher who comes from a long line of
teachers  in  her  family,  with  her  brothers  and  sisters  also practising  teachers.  She
claims to have been struck by the sight of children shining shoes in the street instead of
going to school. The founder of the second school, Mr Zhou Yong’an, who comes from
the province of Jiangxi, has worked as a tertiary teacher and engineer. He says that he
wanted to repay his debt to the rural farm workers who had always treated him well
when he was sent to the countryside on three occasions during the Maoist period. Both
have complied with the Criteria of Sichuan Province for the Establishment of Non-Government
Educational  Institutions 34 that  set  out  the  criteria  that  must  be  met  by  the  school’s
principal and teaching and administrative staff, by its land, buildings and equipment,
as well as the minimum initial investment needed. They have also complied with the
Regulations for the Creation of Schools by the Social Forces 35 published by the Education
Office in their local district, that specify the nature of the application required, as well
as  the  way to  approach the Education Offices  of  both the district  government,  the
administrative village’s government, the street committee, the office of Public Security,
the Office of Prices and finally in the Office of Civil Affairs.
19 With one or two minor exceptions, these two schools meet the standards required. Yet
their  existence  is  threatened.  One  of  them,  Bashu,  has  never  received  a  licence
(xukezheng), and the other, Yangfan, is about to lose its licence. They are both located
on the outskirts of the city, in poor areas with a heavy concentration of migrants. They
do not set any conditions for recruiting students, nor do they require any hukou type
paper, temporary residence permit or government authorisation from the applicant’s
place of origin. As the founder and director of Yangfan school points out, “studying is a
right  that  cannot  suffer  any  condition”.  The  school  fees  are  reasonable,  although
higher than in the Peking schools set up by migrants, owing to the better quality of the
latter (this is saying that the better quality schools are cheaper?). The school fees in
Yangfan amount to 500 yuan a semester for the last part of kindergarten and 550 yuan
per semester for the first year of primary school, increasing by 10 yuan for each grade
thereafter. Bashu, smaller in size, has fees that are slightly higher: 500 yuan a semester
for the final year of kindergarten and 650 yuan a semester for all primary classes. These
fees remain, however, under the ceiling of 750 yuan a semester set by the municipal
authorities  for  private  schools  offering  classes  corresponding  to  the  period  of
compulsory schooling, and, in line with national legislation, families that are struggling
can take advantage of  preferential  rates,  some children even having temporary fee
exemption.  These schools  accommodate a  lot  of  handicapped children who are not
accepted or are badly treated in the state schools. The students follow the compulsory
curriculum in all subjects, including classes in English, music, sport and computing that
are regarded in state schools as being optional and for which the children of migrants
are obliged to pay additional fees.  The textbooks used are the same as in the state
schools.
20 Yangfan School is located to the northwest of the city, in the district of Chenghua. It
comprises a main school at Honghuayan cun (village) and an annex at Qinglong xiang
(canton). The teaching ranges from kindergarten to the first year of secondary school.
Established in January 2002, the school received a licence the following July. It has the
reputation of being the first private school in Chengdu to have taken in children of
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migrants and is also the most important one that we have visited. It has about 1,500
students, spread between 13 classes in the main building and 10 classes in the annex,
and employs 52 teachers as well as 8 administrators. The main school is located in an
old, refurbished warehouse and, while the conditions are modest, the buildings are in
good  order.  The  school  has  a  playground  with  sporting  equipment  (ping-pong,
basketball court), 40 recycled computers, a modest library and a music room. There are,
however, more than fifty pupils per class, which is the maximum allowed under the
law.
21 Bashu School is located to the southwest of the city, in the district of Wuhou. Despite
opening its doors in June 2002 and officially beginning to teach classes in September of
the same year, the school has still to be granted a licence. The teaching extends from
kindergarten to the final year of primary school. The school has 7 classes, one for each
grade made up of between 16 and 50 students. Overall, it has 218 students, 14 teachers
and two administrators.  The teachers,  the majority of  whom are from the city,  are
recruited by specialist employment agencies and have all the necessary diplomas, even
if they do not always have the experience required by law. The school, which occupies
2,500 square metres of land, has put up buildings especially designed for classroom use.
Furthermore, it has a leafy playground area with sporting equipment (basketball court,
parallel bars, ping pong), a canteen with on-site kitchens, 10 recycled computers and an
electric piano.
22 These two schools attest to the real efforts made to bring the quality of their teaching
and equipment closer to that of urban standards, even if they cannot compete with the
flamboyant luxury of the “aristocratic” private schools. In the words of Zhou Yong’an
himself, the level of teaching still needs improvement: 60% of the teaching body in this
school comes from the countryside, where the level of training is mediocre, and some
teachers do not have the five years experience required by law. Many teachers are in
retirement, others come from training departments within companies. In fact, these
schools cannot hope to attract teachers as qualified as those in the prestigious state or
private schools,  due to the lower salaries that they have to offer them: 600 yuan a
month at Yangfan, and from 600 to 800 yuan at Bashu, to which must be added bonuses
in relation to the quality of teaching. Yangfan School encourages its teachers to follow
fee-paying training courses organised by a specialist state school, but the costs have to
be borne by the teachers themselves, as the school cannot take on this responsibility,
although the legislation dealing with private schools requires them to do so. In spite of
these difficulties, these schools offer better educational conditions than schools in rural
areas.
23 The hostility of local governments to these schools specialising in teaching migrant
children cannot be explained solely by the apprehension, as real and justified as it may
be,  of  being held responsible  for  authorising schools  that  do not  provide sufficient
guarantees.  With the absence of any real legislation or control system a factor,  the
number of cases of private schools going bankrupt and closing down has been growing
considerably over the past few years, with school directors disappearing from one day
to the next without reimbursing the money owed to families. However, in the main this
concerns  private  “aristocratic”  schools  and  not  schools  for  migrants.  In  order  to
counteract  this  risk,  the  Criteria  for  the  Establishment  of  Non-Government  Educational
Institutions  in  the  Province  of  Sichuan set  the figure of  200,000 yuan as the minimum
initial investment required for a primary school and one million for a junior secondary
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school. The district governments require, moreover, the educational establishments to
lodge a bank deposit as surety. In the province of Wuhou this amounts to 60,000 yuan
for 320 students and can only be recovered after twenty years. Even if these sums are
often prohibitive for the migrant schools, they do at least guarantee compensation for
families in case of bankruptcy. The district governments responsible for authorising
these schools also refer to their poor material and sanitary conditions to justify their
closure. We have already indicated how specious this argument is in a context where
the children attending these schools—supposed, by law, to be the subject of special
tolerance and support from the authorities—need above all  to see that they have a
guaranteed minimum level of education. The deeper reasons for this hostility are to be
found in  conflicts  of  economic  interest.  The children of  migrants  who attend non-
government schools do not pay the taxes that they are obliged to in the state schools,
which amounts to a financial shortfall both for them and for local governments. The
latter are also little inclined to allocate land to schools that are exempt from income
tax, contrary to businesses. Moreover, granting a licence to a school means subjecting
it  to  regular  controls  concerning  the  content  and  quality  of  its  teaching,  its
administrative  practice  and  financial  management,  its  conditions  of  sanitation  and
security. To guard against this expense, the government of Jingniu district has imposed
“management fees” on Caiyi School that it has recognised, while the law states that
private schools must receive treatment from the authorities that is equal to that given
to  state  schools.  Moreover,  the  authorities  are  obliged  to  create  the  conditions
necessary  to  enable  migrant  children  to  be  schooled,  in  particular  by  supporting
private initiatives 36. Many bureaucrats in the cities therefore continue to consider that
they are not responsible for the compulsory education of non-residents and that they
must be compensated, or even remunerated, for this service. Finally, there also exists
an image problem that should not be ignored. These schools for migrants look dreadful
and are perceived as a element of depreciation in the urban landscape.
24 All these reasons account for the fact that local governments are doing all they can to
keep these schools illegal or have them become illegal. To this end they have recourse
to means that not only fly in the face of legislation, but also devalue the image of the
public authorities.
Bashu School, awaiting legislation
25 Before beginning to enrol students, Bashu School made, as prescribed by legislation, a
request for authorisation of the government of the administrative village of Yongfen
and the Education Office of the government of Wuhou district under whose jurisdiction
it falls, but has not received a positive response. We have been able to gain access to all
the documentation of Bashu School that its founder and director, Mrs Xiao Hongtao,
was kind enough to allow us to consult. We were able to see that the file setting out the
request  for  authorisation  was  complete,  stating  the  precise  status  and  objectives,
justifying the source of the initial capital outlay, and providing a contract for the rent
of the land as well as a building plan, all in due form. A personal file was established for
each teacher and administrative employee justifying their qualifications. The school
clearly maintains its non-lucrative objectives, its statutes specifying that all profits will
be reinvested for five years, at the end of which period only 20% will be distributed to
the  shareholders.  Furthermore,  the  school  has  a  board  that  works  perfectly  well,
whereas the Sichuan Province Regulations for the Establishment of Schools by the Social Forces
mention the existence of such a body as a possibility and not an obligation.
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26 Nonetheless,  the  school  has  two  weaknesses  with  regard  to  the  Sichuan  Province
Regulations  for  the  Establishment  of  Non-Government  Educational  Institutions.  The  one
concerns  its  equipment,  the  other  the  qualification  of  its  teachers.  Lacking  are  a
laboratory for experiments, a library and a music room, although that does not in any
way prevent music classes from being held. Moreover, only four teachers out of the ten
that the school had at the time of its opening have accreditation, although all have at
the very least completed the second year of teacher training college, as laid down in the
legislation.  As  far  as  the  first  issue  is  concerned,  none  of  the  schools  for  migrant
children that we visited, some of which have been officially recognised by the state (37),
possess all the material required by the Regulations as the investment required is too
great  for  this  type  of  institution  and  the  risk  too  important  in  case  of  a  licence
application being rejected. Moreover, we have already pointed out that this type of
school has had quite some difficulty attracting fully qualified teachers. The six teachers
without any accreditation either come from outside of Chengdu and, although having
received accreditation in their place of origin, are not recognised by this municipality,
or young teachers who have not yet finished the three to five years of practical training
required before being able to sit the examination.
27 On August  15th 2002,  Bashu received  a  notice  from the  Education  Office  in  Wuhou
district that, based on the school’s dossier, advised that the land, infrastructure and
pedagogical material and quality of teachers did not meet the required standards and
that it was therefore not authorising the school to open. It had to cease immediately all
advertising and recruitment of students. This notice was followed, on September 3rd
2002, a few days after the start of classes, by a notice of administrative sanction from
the Education Office of Wuhou district announcing the closing of the school and, on
September 11th, by a decision of administrative sanction from the same office setting
the school’s date of “eradication” at 30 days after receipt of the letter.
28 The notice of September 3rd cited article 45 of the Regulations of Sichuan Province for the
Establishment of Schools by the Social Forces specifying that schools can only be shut down
after  a  trial  period  of  bringing  them up to  scratch granted by  the  authorities  and
stating that the various attempts at arbitration put in place by the administration had
all  failed.  In  terms  of  arbitration,  both  the  administrative  village  and  district
governments  sent  representatives  to  stick  up  posters  dazibao vilifying  “the  illegal
school”.  A  campaign  of  defamation  was  orchestrated  in  the  local  popular  press,
denouncing the dilapidated state of the place, the incompetence of its teachers and
administrators, and accusing its director of employing only family relations and having
the  lure  of  gain  as  his  sole  motivation  38.  On  several  occasions,  accompanied  by
considerable numbers of policemen, some bureaucrats went to Bashu to give teachers
the  order  to  resign and to  tell  parents  to  take  their  children out  of  the  school  in
exchange  for  assistance  in  seeking  employment.  The  main  official  in  charge  of
education in the government of the administrative  village of Fengxiang,  whom the
Bashu  officials  accuse  of  collusion  with  the  state  schools,  even  personally  led  a
campaign  within  Bashu  School  itself,  as in  the  marketplaces  and  fairs  in  the
surrounding areas, to sing the praises of state schools coming under his administration,
affirming that they would cost only 400 yuan a semester in fees for children leaving
Bashu. On August 27th 2002, in the middle of a heat wave, the local officials cut off the
school’s water and electricity supply, thereby causing several students and teachers to
be affected by the heat.
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29 For  its  part,  Bashu  School  tried  on  several  occasions  to  argue  its  case  to  the
administrative  services  but  received  the  reply  that  it  would  not  obtain  any
authorisation unless it lodged a significant financial surety in the bank (which it did),
and then invest 40 million yuan to build a “school with standards”, that is to say able to
compete  with  the  splendour  of  “aristocratic”  private  schools  from  which  local
governments  raise  taxes  more  or  less  legally  in  the  form  of  a  percentage  of  the
investment, “construction costs” and other “management fees”. According to Bashu
School  officials,  the  line  that  the  authorities  are  taking  is  one  that  aims  less  to
guarantee  the  rights  of  students  and  their  families  than  to  advance  the  personal
enrichment of bureaucrats. Either a school has the means of getting the authorities
interested in its profits and accordingly sees its lucrative objectives encouraged to the
contempt of the law (39), or it cannot overcome the economic hurdles that are put in its
way and “disappears of its own accord” (zisheng zimie) by going bankrupt. This is the
case  of  Kaiming  School  in  Chongqing,  another  school  that  specialises  in  taking  in
migrant children, and that had an initial investment of 90 million yuan imposed on it
by the authorities. It contracted a loan of 80 million that it was not able to repay 40.
According to this logic,  the “schools for the poor” (pingmin xuexiao)  always lose out
alongside the “schools for the aristocrats” (guizu xuexiao).
30 Encouraged by the support and action of parents, Bashu School has carried on with its
activities, but lives under the constant threat of being “eradicated”. This implies not
only that the teaching that it offers has no recognised value, but also that the school
cannot  take  the  risk  of  investing  to  improve  the  quality  of  its  infrastructure  and
teaching.
Yangfan School, under threat of losing its status
31 The difficulties encountered by Zhou Yong’an in trying to get a licence for his school
have been similar to those of Bashu School, although the outcome has been a happier
one. Zhou Yong’an opened the doors of Yangfan School in January 2002, at the very
time when his request for authorisation had just been rejected by the authorities of
Chenghua district. In spite of the banning of his school, Zhou Yong’an did not close it
and, six months later, obtained a licence thanks to the support of the parents, to the
fact that he was able to come to some arrangement with local government bureaucrats
and to the help of  the local  written press  and television,  which were also liberally
compensated for their commitment in favour of the education of migrant children. All
this was possible on account of the size of the school, which, in addition, was an instant
success with the migrant families themselves. Clearly, smaller schools that have a less
significant initial investment and receive fewer students—as is the case of Bashu, but
also of two other schools in Chenghua district (41)—cannot spend as much money to
gain state recognition.
32 The problem with the guarantee for this school is not, however, resolved yet, as the
government of Chenghua has introduced an annual licence renewal process, despite
the fact that national and provincial legislation states that this is only necessary when a
school changes its objectives and the content of its teaching, or changes its location 42.
The Criteria of the Province of Sichuan for the Establishment of Non-Government Educational
Institutions stipulate that primary schools must provide an area of eight square metres
per student. Enrolments have been so significant, however, since the school’s opening
that the buildings have become largely inadequate.  Zhou Yong’an therefore made a
request to his district government to lease and build on land adjoining the school’s
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main site. The government refused this request, however, preferring to rent it out to a
business paying taxes, despite both national and provincial laws stressing that schools
have priority in the allocation of land 43. Zhou Yong’an was therefore forced to destroy
some parts of the school, including the canteen, the majority of the teachers’ living
quarters and the room for experiments in order to put up new classrooms. Children
aged between six and seven are thus forced to leave the school at lunchtime to get food
from  street  stalls.  Moreover,  this  solution  does  nothing  to  fix the  problem  as  the
canteen and the room for experiments are themselves required for obtaining a licence.
Since last  January,  Zhou  Yong’an  has  received  several  visits  from  inspectors
threatening him with the closure of his school. In the opinion of the school principals
themselves whom we met, the strategy of the authorities thus consists in causing these
schools to be in infringement of the law so as to prevent them from obtaining a licence
or disallow its renewal.
Strategies of resistance
33 Faced with the same arbitrary situation, Bashu and Yangfan have adopted two radically
different strategies to protect themselves. One has resolutely chosen to put itself on the
side of right and the law, while the other has exploited the dysfunction of the system.
34 A short time after receiving the first notice of closure of the school, Gan Bingxiang, who
was  co-founder  of  Bashu  School  with  his  wife,  sent  a  “letter  of  complaint  to  the
directors” addressed to the government of the administrative village, the Education
Offices in the district, the municipality and the province, the Municipal Office of Laws
and  Regulations,  as  well  as  the  People’s  Assemblies  of  the  municipality  and  the
province, having recourse in the process to a practice that has been used in China since
imperial  times.  Acting  as  his  own  advocate,  the  letter  writer  called  on  the  higher
leaders to “apply the law with severity and clarity, and maintain rights and equity”
(mingjing gaoxuan, bingfa gongzheng), spelling out the objectives and conditions of his
school,  the  steps  taken  to  bring  it  into  line  and  the  difficulties  encountered,  and
scrupulously cited all the articles of law on which his business was based. The letter
ended with an appeal to save his school in the name of the right to an education for all
and with a warning about the social consequences that are to be feared if this right is
not  respected.  This  letter  was  accompanied  by  another  complaint,  spontaneously
written by the parents of the schoolchildren, in which they describe the discrimination
their children face in state schools as well as their satisfaction with Bashu School 44.
Following receipt of the decision to close the premises, the school also appealed to the
Wuhou district People’s Tribunal. But the tribunal confirmed the earlier decision and
set the closing date at January 1st 2003 45. In the meantime, the Education Office of the
municipality of Chengdu had reacted to the complaint addressed to it by sending in a
health  inspection  team  which  then  declared  that  the  school  was  abiding  by  the
standards (46),  while the Sichuan Province’s People’s Congress directly contacted the
Wuhou government, calling upon it temporarily to not close down the school.  It  is,
however, extremely risky for the upper ranks of the Administration to disavow those
lower  down,  who are  furthermore directly  in  charge  of  registering schools,  and to
overturn the decision of the People’s Tribunal of the district of Wuhou that gave a
judicial seal of approval to an administrative decision. The Bashu School, bolstered by
the findings of the health inspection, went again therefore to its district government
that set a new condition for the granting of a licence: the production of a deed of title
to the land. This condition does not figure in any law and for good reason, as in China
virtually all land belongs to the state. It was not, however, formulated by chance, as the
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land rented by the school has been privatised and belongs to a rich businessman, yet
the school remains, theoretically and very hypothetically, protected by the law that
declares a long-term rental agreement to be sufficient 47.
35 If Bashu School, denouncing the absence of any public service perspective among the
bureaucrats,  decided  to  play  the  legal  system  against  arbitrary  decisions,  Yangfan
School has taken a contrary path.  Firmly committed to opening a junior secondary
school, a high school and then a university for migrant children, Zhou Yong’an has just
rented two plots of land in the administrative village of Qinglong which falls under the
jurisdiction of Wuhou district and officially anticipates constructing retirement houses
on it. The authorities are much better disposed to this type of structure that is designed
for city residents and subject to taxation. The first plot of land, of about one hectare,
will house both a primary and a 7,500m2 junior secondary school. The work is already
underway and the schools will open their doors in September. Zhou Yong’an hopes that
the authorities, if they are interested in the undertaking, will not dare to destroy the
schools once they become a fait accompli.  This is far from being clear, however. The
director of Yongfan, conscious of the dangers, and in an attempt to avoid the risks, has
managed to set up a whole social network around his school and to find various kinds
of support in the media (48), academic institutions and mass organisations, that he has
been able to bring together thanks to his comments on the inequality of opportunity,
the  assistance  given  to  migrant  workers  to  settle  in  the  city  and  the  renewal  of
pedagogic methods. On March 29th Zhou Yong’an sealed a collaboration with the Group
of Young Volunteers for Education from the University of Sichuan (49), who signed up to
give free lessons in mathematics, Chinese, English, dance and music on weekends to
any interested student. The inauguration ceremony was presided over by the officials
from the Communist Youth League of Chengdu, the Committees of Young Volunteers of
this league at the municipal and university level, and a representative of the Sichuan
Academy of Social Sciences, who all spoke in front of Chengdu Television cameras and
the educational channel of Sichuan Television in favour of the social commitment of
Yangfan’s director. Zhou Yong’an was able to take advantage of the political climate
introduced by the March 2002 session of the National People’s Congress (NPA),  and
subsequently confirmed at the Sixteenth Congress of the CCP last November, which
came out in favour of the fight against social inequality. This was further reaffirmed at
the Tenth NPC session in March 2003, when the delegates from the Communist Youth
League  denounced  the  inequality  of  treatment  that  the  migrants  are  victim  of,  in
particular in terms of education 50. Zhou Yong’an also skilfully turned the event into a
patriotic  ceremony,  which  opened  with  the  national  anthem  and  was  held  in  the
school’s  playground with  the  flag  of  the  PRC raised  and  a  banner  at  the  entrance
celebrating the school’s  obtaining of  a  licence.  Through this  piece of  theatre,  Zhou
Yong’an was keen to show off his school’s legality as if to exorcise the precariousness of
its status and bear witness to his good and loyal service towards the fatherland at the
very same time as the development of his business was more and more prone to being
interpreted as a sign of opposition to the government.
36 Since then, Zhou Yong’an has been hoping to be able to develop this co-operation, with
which  he  is  also  trying  to  associate  the  Centre  for  Education  and  Training  of  the
Sichuan Academy of Social Sciences, in three directions. Firstly, by setting up technical
training programmes aimed at helping the students to become “little bosses”. Secondly,
by proposing to parents of school children courses in general culture and professional
development in order to help them better settle into life in the city; and thirdly, by
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improving the training of teachers in their respective disciplines, and introducing them
to new pedagogical methods that are adapted to migrant children. These projects also
have the goal of developing partnerships with official institutions under whose wing
the school could be placed. In the interim, however, the Sichuan Academy of Social
Sciences has refused to set itself up as an “umbrella institution” (guakao danwei) of the
school,  which,  in  exchange  for  a  share  in  the  latter’s  capital,  would  have  allowed
Yangfan to come under the auspices of an official institution and so settle the matter of
its status once and for all 51.
The anomalies of the system
37 It  is thought that there are about ten schools for migrant children in Chengdu. We
know five of them, two of which have obtained a licence but one only—Caiyi xuexiao—
seems to have had its status assured. The others, “neither eliminated nor recognised”
(bu qudi ye bu chengren), find themselves in a precarious position. Local governments
are hesitant about closing them, in so far as they have not yet come up with any viable
solution to the situation of migrant children whose needs these schools are at least
meeting. From a confidential document of the Chenghua district government to which
we have had access (52), it is clear that the tactics of the authorities are to have all the
migrant children attend state schools. For that they envisage increasing their capacity
to accommodate these children by building annexes. However, nothing is said about
the reasons why immigrant parents cannot or will not send their children to state-run
schools:  yet  we have seen how the lower ranks of  the Administration have had an
interest  in  maintaining  a  discriminatory  system.  If  local  governments  are  nervous
about closing these schools, it is also because they are running up against the hostility
of the people concerned for whom these schools represent the only hope and who have
already shown that they are prepared to take action in order to defend them. Finally,
the  governments  in  the  administrative  villages  and the  districts  are  in  the  wrong,
something which the upper  echelons of  power are  well  aware of,  as  shown by the
support given to Bashu School by the Education Office in the municipality of Chengdu
and by the People’s  Congress  in  Sichuan Province.  If  these  schools  are  illegal,  it  is
because local governments are refusing to grant them a licence, while the substandard
material, teaching and management conditions that they highlight 53 in order not to
authorise these schools are no more than the result of their own policies. The answer to
the problem lies rather in regularising these schools and in introducing a system of
control and support which would help them to improve their conditions, in accordance
with the letter of the law.
38 In the meantime, migrant children are the first victims of the lack of public recognition
of their schools.  Their years of  study in them have no certified value and they are
routinely forced to interrupt their education following the closure of their school. The
administration, management and quality of teaching in these schools are not subject to
any control and their principals are not encouraged to invest so as to improve the
situation.  Indeed,  in  the  total  absence  of  any  control  over  profits,  the  latter  are
sometimes grabbed by those in charge of the school,  and multiple bankruptcies are
occurring without the families being compensated or the children schooled elsewhere
54. The students are thus sometimes hostage to the ambition of principals in a context
of growing and non-regulated competition. In Peking, in order to attract new clients,
some schools for migrants have begun to put in place an expensive infrastructure and
to implement new services the cost of which must be borne by the families, who do not
always have any other alternative for educating their children. This “commodification”
The Hazards of the Right to an Education
China Perspectives, 48 | july- august 2003
15
of education has already been denounced by Chinese researchers,  in particular Han
Jialing  55.  In  Chengdu,  the  ambition of Yangfan School  is  putting  the  children it  is
accommodating at risk through its illegal investments. But these schools can just as
well  turn  out  to  be  models  of  a  republican school,  as  witnessed  by  the  parents  of
children attending Bashu School.  They point out that,  contrary to students in state
schools,  their  children  are  treated  with  respect  and  equality,  whatever  their
background.  They  consider  themselves  to  be  very  satisfied  with  their  academic
progress as well as with their acquisition of fundamental values. Struggling families are
to  benefit  from  preferential  measures  based  on social  criteria,  and  handicapped
children  receive  special  attention.  Relations  within  the  school  itself  are  based  on
solidarity: the parents are very grateful to the teachers for taking some of their spare
time to organise study groups and help those children who are having problems with
their  school  work,  staying  with  them  until  the  parents  have  finished  work  or
accompanying them back home when they cannot come to collect them. Bashu, like
Yangfan, opens its doors on Saturdays and Sundays to offer a place of social interaction
to children who are too often left to their own devices. Both of them organise regular
meetings  with  parents  to  inform  them  of  the  school’s  situation  and  pedagogical
practice and to hear their proposals. This initiative is a clear break with the way in
which they are received in state schools where they are neither listened to nor given
any information. Yangfan even has its own publication, to which the teachers, students
and parents contribute. Free of charge, it gives news of the school, information about
the  migrant  population,  in  particular  legislation  concerning  them,  and  offers  a
platform for supporting parents and students at the school. It has a print-run of 1,500
and the condition for the existence of this gazette is that it is not distributed outside
the school. As the mobilisation of parents of children at Bashu shows, “the republican
school” could well turn out to be “the school of democracy”, unless the authorities rush
to regain control of it by regularising these schools.
39 Forces at work and future perspectives
40 While the question of accommodating migrant children was not raised until the latter
part of the 1980s, Chinese intellectuals have gradually, since then, become involved in
favour  of  the  universal  right  to  education.  Researchers,  some  of  whom  belong  to
government  think-tanks,  have,  over  the  past  few  years,  being  publishing  detailed
reports submitted directly to the government. We have already cited Han Jialing of the
Institute of Sociology of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), to whom we
could add Wang Chunguang,  also  from the CASS,  as  well  as  Cui  Chuanyi  and Zhou
Shukai of the State Council’s Research Centre for Development 56. Journalists are also
playing an important role in the development of thinking and public opinion, from He
Nanying’s outcry of protest in 1996 denouncing the emergence of a “new generation of
illiterates” 57 to the recent report by the Nanfang Zhoumo 58 on the “cleansing” of 16
schools in the Peking district of Fengtai last February. This gathering momentum is
having a certain impact on the central government. In May 2001, the State Council
published a Decision on the Reform and the Development of Basic Education 59 that mentioned
the  need  to  take  account  of  the  education  of  migrant  children  by  making  their
acceptance in public schools a priority. Last January, the Ruling on Successfully Managing
the  Employment  of  Rural  Farm Workers  in  the  Cities  and their  Access  to  Public  Services 60
carried a clause stipulating “that the right to compulsory education for the children of
migrant workers must be guaranteed”. Local governments are required to take steps so
that  these children can enjoy the same teaching conditions in state schools  as  city
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residents  do  and  to  support  any  “substandard  schools”  by  bringing  them  into  the
development  plans  for  education  and  helping  them  to  improve  their  material  and
pedagogical  conditions instead of eliminating them. Finally,  urban governments are
required to devote a part of their budget to the education of these children.
41 However, these signs of goodwill often still remain a dead letter in the absence of any
detailed and compelling legislation.  Thus,  the Peking district  of  Fengtai,  which was
chosen by the municipal authorities on two occasions, in 1996 and 1998, as a pilot site
for testing the national legislation concerning schools for migrants, not only has not
contributed  to  improving  conditions  in  these  schools,  but  has  even  organised  two
“cleansing”  campaigns,  the  first  of  which,  in  2001,  allowed the  “eradication”  of  50
schools 61. The opposition between the central and local authorities is clear. The former
are happy just to devise general principles, leaving to the latter the task of elaborating
the corresponding legislation and bearing the costs of it.
42 Since March 2002, however, the beginning of a consensus seems to be emerging over
the fact that it is better to prevent a social evil than to cure it. It is this spirit that
prevailed at the 16th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) last November,
whereas the Fifteenth Congress in 1997 had as it were proclaimed the need for a two-
geared society for speeding up the economic development of the countryside. With the
deepening of the social crisis, the CCP became conscious that the increase in the rate of
growth was  no longer  enough to  ensure  its  legitimacy,  so  it  came to  set  itself  the
objective  of  creating  a  more  egalitarian  society  of  relative  prosperity,  the  latter
understood as being more evenly shared. In this context, resolutely reformist voices
were heard within the Party and the state, and some initiatives sprang up. Last March,
the  first  session  of  the  Tenth  National  People’s  Congress  gave  a  platform to  these
reformers. We have already mentioned the firm line taken by the Communist Youth
League in favour of equality of rights for migrants, in particular concerning education.
A group of representatives warned against “the social sickness” which is on the verge
of developing if the situation of migrant workers does not receive greater attention.
Citing the rising figures of  delinquency,  one representative commented on them as
follows: “respect for society supposes that society respects the dignity of the person” 62.
This point of view is also shared by local executive bodies, as attested by the initiative
of  Xiamen  municipality  which,  in  August  2002,  published  legislation  allowing  the
regularisation  of  34  private  schools  for  migrants  and  creating  a  special  office
responsible for financing, controlling and giving direction to them. The boldness of this
initiative should, however, be put in a relative context. Nearly half of the population of
Xiamen is not originally from the city and the authorities are conscious that its 30,000
migrant children represent the future of the Special Economic Zone 63.
43 Power is thus divided according to divergent interests and points of view, and there is
no doubt that this will favour change. The relations between the different rungs of the
Administration  in  Sichuan  Province  is  particularly  interesting  and  creates  more
favourable  prospects  for  development  than  in  some  large  cities  in  eastern  China.
Indeed, how can one explain that, until now, no campaign for eradicating schools for
migrant  children  has  been  conducted  in  Chengdu,  whereas  such  campaigns  are
regularly organised in cities like Peking, Shanghai and even Shenzhen? We must no
doubt see in this the particular character of this city with respect to municipalities
under direct administration or the Special Economic Zones in the eastern part of China.
On  the  one  hand,  Chengdu  is  facing  a  massive  rural  exodus,  essentially  from  the
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province of which it is the capital, contrary to the major eastern cities that are taking
in migrants, from the whole of the country, despite having much more tenuous identity
and cultural links with them and without having any direct administrative obligation
towards them. On the other hand, the capital of Sichuan is a part of the network of
urban  centres  that  form  the  backbone  of  the  policy  of  development  in  the  west
introduced in the summer of 1999 and which are consequently called on to develop,
whereas  the  cities  in  the  east,  which  have  already  reached  a  certain  level  of
development, are on the contrary trying to reduce immigration, thanks to much more
radical control measures and selection policies based on socio-economic criteria. Thus,
the willingness of the Centre to give assistance and support to disadvantaged social
groups  runs  up  against  the  concerns  of  the  Sichuan  People’s  Congress,  which  is
supposed to represent the whole of the provincial population. The latter has not only
given  its  support  to  Bashu  School,  but  last  November  also  made  proposals  for
establishing  schools  that  could  accommodate  migrant  children,  providing  the
Provincial  Education  Office  with  a  fund  of  two  million  yuan  to  set  up  a  special
programme for the compulsory schooling of these children and forcing the municipal
bodies in charge of finance and education to create public schools to receive migrants
64. The municipality of Chengdu seems somewhat more hesitant and divided. For one
thing, it has obtained permission from the Sichuan People’s Congress for exemption
from the provincial reform of the hukou, enabling migrants having a fixed income and
housing to become urban citizens 65. Secondly, control of migrants there is less strict
than in the major cities of the east 66 and the mayor has given his symbolic support to
the director of Yangfan who had come to seek his help by stating that Chengdu had to
create its own model for finding a place in school for migrant children (67), while the
Education Office has given its support to Bashu. However, the municipal government
has still  not  published any legislation concerning the schools  for  migrant  children,
which  leaves  a  doubt  hanging  over  its  position,  between  support  and  repression,
something that the government of Chenghua district is complaining about, asking it to
strengthen its means of eradicating these schools 68. Finally, the governments of the
administrative  villages  and  districts  remain,  essentially  for  economic  reasons,
refractory to the lifting of barriers that are standing in the way of equal rights for
migrants and urban residents alike. While the latter may retain their full powers as far
as the authorisation of schools goes, their power of repression is limited by national
legislation,  the  position  of  the  Provincial  Congress  and  the  ambivalence  of  the
municipal  government  which  refuses  to  align  itself  to  their  position,  yet  without
granting the funds needed to resolve these contradictions. The question now is to know
if the policy of developing the west will result in a demographic rebalance between
rural residents and those in the city so that, in the fashion of Xiamen, the municipality
of Chengdu can combine its interests with those of the immigrant workers.
44 China has been undertaking economic reforms for nearly a quarter-century now, but
during this time it has not questioned a system of residency that has on the contrary
been  reinforced  by  the  policies  of  decentralisation,  thereby  counteracting  the
apparently universal import of legislation in the area of education. In a general way,
people  who  come—directly  or  through  family  ties—from  the  countryside  remain
second-class citizens. The mediocrity of the education system in rural areas and the
hurdles placed in the way of the schooling of children in urban areas are depriving
them  of  equal  opportunities  with  urban  residents.  In  town,  the  practice  of  the
authorities remains largely discriminatory and the label “migrant” persists as a stigma
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with a very good chance of being passed on to future generations. The Chinese state
continues to put up obstacles to the recognition of schools for migrants. Yet, at the
same time, it has been able to guarantee the existence of a private educational sector
for  city  residents,  which  reveals  a  lot  about  the  contradictions  and  failures  of  the
system. Until now, the government has had individuals bear the brunt of the cost of the
disparity between economic reforms and political reforms, but over the past year or so
there have been signs of a new awareness within the ruling elite.  The cost paid by
individuals ends up being borne by the country as a whole, and the Party risks being its
first debtor. The developing consciousness of the attendant risks thus lets one hope
that special attention will be given to the right to an education for all, which is the
pillar  of  the  regime's  intangible  principles  of  social  stability  and  economic
development.
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